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“DON’T CONFUSE ME WITH THE FACTS”: THE USE AND 
MISUSE OF SOCIAL SCIENCE ON THE UNITED STATES 
SUPREME COURT 
WILLIAM D. BLAKE* 
INTRODUCTION 
Chief Justice John Roberts evoked a collective groan from social scien-
tists during oral arguments in the Wisconsin partisan gerrymandering case, 
Gill v. Whitford.1  He argued the plaintiffs were attempting to remove reap-
portionment decisions “from democracy and [were] throwing them into the 
courts pursuant to, and it may be simply my educational background, but I 
can only describe as sociological gobbledygook.”2  The (exasperated) plain-
tiff’s attorney responded, “Your Honor, this is—this is not complicated.”3  
Justice Breyer then jumped in to ask a more sympathetic question.4 
These interrogatories focused on the intelligibility of the efficiency gap, 
a mathematical formula proposed by the plaintiffs to evaluate the severity of 
partisan gerrymandering.5  If Chief Justice Roberts’s characterization of the 
efficiency gap was accurate, one can imagine judges needing an army of re-
search assistants furiously writing statistical code in Stata6 to decipher its 
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The quote “Don’t confuse me with the facts” is most famously associated with Rep. Earl Landgrebe 
(R-IN), a staunch Nixon supporter, explaining why he refused to support the president’s impeach-
ment.  The phrase, of course, is much older, with one version going back to the writings of Plato.  
See My Mind Is Made Up. Don’t Confuse Me with the Facts, QUOTE INVESTIGATOR (Feb. 13, 2013), 
https://quoteinvestigator.com/2013/02/13/confuse-me/#return-note-5452-10. 
 1.  138 S. Ct. 1916 (2018). 
 2.  Transcript of Oral Argument at 40, Gill v. Whitford, 138 S. Ct. 1916 (2018) (No. 16-1611).  
This quip led the American Sociological Association to write an open letter to the Chief Justice 
defending social science on this and other issues that come before the Court.  See Dylan Matthews, 
Chief Justice John Roberts Is Now Feuding with the Entire Field of Sociology, VOX (Oct. 12, 2017, 
11:20 AM), https://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/2017/10/12/16464188/john-roberts-socio-
logical-gobbledygook-eduardo-bonilla-silva-gerrymandering.  The failure of the American Political 
Science Association to respond prompted an even louder groan from yours truly.   
 3.  Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 2, at 40. 
 4.  See id. (“Can you answer the Chief Justice’s question and say the reason they lost is be-
cause if party A wins a majority of votes, party A controls the legislature.  That seems fair.”). 
 5.  See Nicholas Stephanopoulos & Eric McGhee, Partisan Gerrymandering and the Effi-
ciency Gap, 82 U. CHI. L. REV. 831 (2015). 
 6.  Stata is a statistical software program used by researchers to manipulate and explain com-
plex data sets.  STATA, https://www.stata.com/ (last visited Aug. 1, 2019). 
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meaning.  In reality, what seemed to baffle the Chief Justice is a simple alge-
braic expression, invented by a political scientist that any high school fresh-
man should be able to calculate.7  Earlier in oral argument, Justice Breyer 
had described the efficiency gap as, “not quite so complicated as the opposi-
tion makes it think.”8 
This exchange begs the question: what explains the radically different 
attitudes towards social science between these two Justices?  For starters, 
Chief Justice Roberts was a history major as an undergraduate,9 while Justice 
Breyer received a bachelors in PPE (philosophy, politics, and economics) at 
Oxford University.10  Perhaps Chief Justice Roberts is being honest about his 
educational background in that he may be less familiar with (and therefore 
less comfortable using) quantitative methods compared to Justice Breyer.  Of 
course, Chief Justice Roberts is also a conservative, while Justice Breyer is 
more liberal in his judicial ideology.11  Some studies indicate conservatives 
express less trust in scientists than liberals.12  The literature also indicates 
people on both ends of the ideological spectrum use science to support their 
underlying worldview,13 which is what Justice Breyer did in this case.  Other 
studies find individuals, on the left and right, are more likely to deny the 
accuracy of science that challenges their ideology,14 much like the Chief Jus-
tice did. 
Technology complicates constitutional inquiries on many issues, not 
just gerrymandering, so the Court needs to be scientifically literate to evalu-
ate them.  Anecdotal evidence suggests this is not the case.  Justice Antonin 
Scalia refused to join part of an opinion written by fellow conservative Justice 
Clarence Thomas because Justice Scalia did not agree with the statement, 
                                                        
 7.  The formula is calculated as follows: Efficiency Gap = Seat Margin – (2 × Vote Margin).  
Stephanopoulos & McGhee, supra note 5, at 853.  “Seat Margin” refers to the share of all seats in a 
legislature held by a party minus fifty percent.  Id.  “Vote Margin” is the share of votes a party 
received, minus fifty percent.  Id.  An electoral advantage exists when the efficiency gap is positive, 
and a negative efficiency gap score indicates a party faces an electoral disadvantage.  Id.  If one 
party controls redistricting and increases its efficiency gap measure in the next election, judges can 
infer that legislators drew district lines to gain a partisan advantage. 
 8.  Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 2, at 12. 
 9.  Adam Liptak, A Case for Math, Not ‘Gobbledygook,’ in Judging Partisan Voting Maps, 
N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 16, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/01/15/us/politics/gerrymandering-
math.html. 
 10.  See Lincoln Caplan, A Workable Democracy, HARV. MAG. (2017), https://harvardmaga-
zine.com/2017/03/a-workable-democracy. 
 11.  Lee Epstein et al., The Judicial Common Space, 23 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 303, 318–20 (2007). 
 12.  Michael A. Cacciatore et al., Opposing Ends of the Spectrum: Exploring Trust in Scientific 
and Religious Authorities, 27 PUB. UNDERSTANDING SCI. 11, 19 (2016). 
 13.  Feng Shi et al., Millions of Online Book Co-purchases Reveal Partisan Differences in the 
Consumption of Science, 1 NAT. HUM. BEHAV. 79 (2017). 
 14.  Anthony N. Washburn & Linda J. Skitka, Science Denial Across the Political Divide: Lib-
erals and Conservatives Are Similarly Motivated to Deny Attitude-Inconsistent Science, 1 SOC. 
PSYCHOL. & PERSONALITY SCI. 2 (2017) (finding individuals on the left and right are similarly 
motivated to discount scientific claims that challenge their worldview). 
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“Genes form the basis for hereditary traits in living organisms.”15  In debates 
over whether the death penalty deters crime, Professor John Donohue said, 
“Scalia was willing to cite work that was thoroughly refuted by an accepted 
scholarly institution, without feeling any need to buttress his position,” while 
rejecting the most rigorous research on the subject.16 
Justice William Brennan outlined a hypothesis as to why Justices may 
not be the best consumers of scientific information: “It is unrealistic to expect 
either members of the judiciary or state officials to be well versed in the rigors 
of experimental or statistical technique.”17  Justice Brennan, unlike Justice 
Scalia, was a judicial liberal who majored in economics,18 and he cited social 
science in more opinions than any other Justice in the last sixty years.19  Iron-
ically, however, when Justice Brennan issued this warning about judicial 
competencies concerning statistics, he proceeded to misstate a key scientific 
finding about gender, age, and the tendency to drink and drive.20 
This Article moves beyond the anecdotal and presents a more compre-
hensive qualitative and quantitative account of social science in Supreme 
Court decisions.  To set the stage, Part I will provide a brief narrative of the 
role of social science in Supreme Court decisions from the Lochner Era 
through Brown v. Board of Education.21  While it would be tempting to con-
clude that social science evidence helped progressive advocates overturn 
conservative economic and civil rights precedents, the history is more com-
plicated.  As the social sciences became increasingly quantitative in their ap-
proach, Justices, who usually lack statistical training,22 are more likely to 
question the utility of social science.  The Court also used junk science to 
justify their decisions, and this problem predates the rise of quantitative meth-
odology. 
                                                        
 15.  Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 569 U.S. 576, 580 (2013).  As 
Justice Scalia wrote, “I am unable to affirm [the fine details of molecular biology] on my own 
knowledge or even my own belief.”  Id. at 596 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the 
judgment). 
 16.  Emily Bazelon, Antonin Scalia Didn’t Trust Science, N.Y. TIMES MAG., (Dec. 21, 2016), 
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2016/12/21/magazine/the-lives-they-lived-antonin-
scalia.html. 
 17.  Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 204 (1976). 
 18.  Clement E. Vose, The National Consumers’ League and the Brandeis Brief, 1 MIDWEST J. 
POL. SCI. 267, 277 (1957). 
 19.  See infra Table 2, Section II.B. 
 20.  See infra notes 112–118 and accompanying text.   
 21.  347 U.S. 483 (1954).   
 22.  The exception to this might be Justice Harry Blackmun, who was a math major at Harvard 
University.  See infra note 143 and accompanying text.  Perhaps not so coincidentally, Justice 
Blackmun cited social science at the fifth highest rate among the thirty-four Justices included in my 
sample.  See Table 2 infra Section II.B. 
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Part III will consider the competing incentives for Justices to make ap-
peals to science, blending insights from the major theories of judicial behav-
ior in political science.  To test this theory, I collected an original dataset of 
Supreme Court citations to social science studies from the Warren Court 
through today.  A series of multivariate logistic regression analyses indicates 
scientific references are more likely to appear in salient cases.  Justices who 
majored in a scientific discipline as an undergraduate are more likely to cite 
social science than others. 
Moreover, liberal Justices are significantly more likely to cite social sci-
ence research than conservatives.  The relationship between social science 
and judicial behavior is not just partisan; it is polarizing.  The data indicate 
Justices on the Court’s left are more likely to invoke science in order to justify 
a liberal opinion, while Justices on the right are more likely to invoke science 
to justify a conservative opinion.  The polarizing effect of social science ref-
erences is even stronger in dissenting opinions.  This Article will conclude 
by considering the normative implications of the findings and the need for 
future research. 
I.  A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE ROLE OF SOCIAL SCIENCE IN SUPREME COURT 
OPINIONS 
The conventional account of social science influencing Supreme Court 
decisions typically begins with the “Brandeis Brief” in Muller v. Oregon.23  
The traditional narrative emphasizes how science provided objective evi-
dence that mediated the desire of a conservative Court to uphold liberty of 
contract.  The next major chapter in the relationship between social science 
and judicial decisionmaking focuses on Footnote 11 of Brown v. Board of 
Education.24  Here again, we are made to think that social science provided 
objective evidence for progressive reformers to advance their agenda. 
In this Section, I point out several flaws in this narrative.  First, it ignores 
how poorly constructed many of these scientific studies were.  Junk science 
sometimes caused progressive reformers to enact policies contrary to their 
stated goals, as in the case of the electric chair providing a more “humane” 
form of execution.  Conservatives also used racist pseudo-science to persuade 
the Court to uphold segregation.  Most importantly, it fails to account for the 
confusion and skepticism towards social science that many Supreme Court 
Justices have expressed in more recent times.  I build on previous scholarship 
that argues that the New Deal changed both the priorities of the American 
state and the social sciences.  As quantitative methods became the dominant 
                                                        
 23.  208 U.S. 412 (1908).  For a revisionist account of the role of the Brandeis Brief, see Noga 
Morag-Levine, Facts, Formalism, and the Brandeis Brief: The Origins of a Myth, 2013 U. ILL. L. 
REV. 59 (2013).   
 24.  347 U.S. at 494 n.11.  
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mode of analysis within the social sciences, judges became less able to eval-
uate the accuracy and usefulness of the science they cite. 
A.  The Brandeis (-Goldmark-Frankfurter) Brief(s) During the Lochner 
Era 
According to the familiar story of the Brandeis Brief, the invalidation of 
a law regulating work hours for bakers in Lochner v. New York25 forced pro-
gressive advocates to adopt a new strategy to overcome liberty of contract 
objections.  Three years after Lochner, a challenge to a ten-hour workday law 
for women reached the Court.  The state of Oregon turned to the National 
Consumers’ League and its lead counsel, Louis Brandeis to argue the case.  
The brief Brandeis submitted, which was researched and written in about one 
month,26 contained two pages of legal argument followed by 111 more pages 
of “new empirical evidence.”27 
Brandeis also relied on the scientific evidence from his brief in a com-
mand performance during oral argument.  According to one observer, 
“[Brandeis] not only reached the Court but he dwarfed the Court, because it 
was clear that here stood a man who knew infinitely more, and who cared 
infinitely more, for the vital daily rights of the people than the men who sat 
there sworn to protect them.”28  The strategy paid off.  The Court unani-
mously upheld the Oregon statute and expressed admiration for the infor-
mation contained in the brief.29  The Court’s decision in Muller is consistent 
with modern political science research, which finds amicus curiae briefs are 
influential because they provide Justices with information they otherwise 
would not have when deciding a case.30 
Perhaps Brandeis received his inspiration for this litigation strategy 
from Justice Harlan’s dissenting opinion in Lochner.  Justice Harlan’s dis-
sent, unlike that of Justice Holmes, recognized the legitimacy of liberty of 
contract.  Justice Harlan, however, disagreed with the majority over whether 
the New York Bakeshop Act served a legitimate public purpose.  Justice Har-
                                                        
 25.  198 U.S. 45 (1905). 
 26.  Vose, supra note 18, at 277. 
 27.  JOSEPHINE GOLDMARK, FATIGUE AND EFFICIENCY: A STUDY IN INDUSTRY 252 (1912). 
 28.  Vose, supra note 18, at 280 (citing William Hitz to Felix Frankfurter, National Consumer 
League Papers (Dec. 1914)). 
 29.  Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412, 419 (1908) (Brewer, J.) (“It may not be amiss . . . to notice 
the course of legislation as well as expressions of opinion from other than judicial sources.  In the 
brief filed by Mr. Louis D. Brandeis, for the defendant in error, is a very copious collection of all 
these matters . . . .”). 
 30.  Paul M. Collins Jr., Friends of the Court: Examining the Influence of Amicus Curiae Par-
ticipation in U.S. Supreme Court Litigation, 38 L. & SOC’Y REV. 807 (2004). 
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lan believed bakers faced dangerous working conditions, relying on data pro-
vided in Professor Ludwig Hirt’s Diseases of the Workers.31  Bakers, accord-
ing to Hirt, were “pale-faced” because they endured “intense heat,” and ex-
posure to flour dust caused “inflammation of the lungs” and “running eyes.”32  
Hirt concluded, “The labor of the bakers is among the hardest and most la-
borious imaginable . . . .”33  None of this information was provided to the 
Court in New York’s brief. 
If otherwise conservative Justices were willing to uphold laws backed 
by social science evidence, why did New York refuse to utilize this strategy 
in Lochner?  Legal historian Paul Kens blames New York Attorney General 
Julius Mayer for being incompetent.34  Professor Noga Morag-Levine, on the 
other hand, offers a more systematic explanation: the Court had traditionally 
deferred to legislative judgments about how a state chooses to exercise its 
police powers.35  For example, in the 1873 Slaughter-House Cases,36 the 
Court refused to question the wisdom of granting a monopoly to one New 
Orleans slaughterhouse.  The state legislature enacted the law as a response 
to cholera outbreaks caused by animal remains that infected the city’s water 
supply.37  Attorney General Mayer thought he would enjoy the same benefit 
of the doubt in Lochner.38 
The typical account of the Brandeis Brief is incomplete in four im-
portant respects.  First, it belies the true authorship of the brief itself.  While 
Brandeis deserves credit for adopting the strategy of providing scientific ev-
idence, he did not conduct the research.39  Justice Brewer should have paid 
homage to Brandeis’ sister-in-law, Josephine Goldmark, for the thorough-
ness of the Muller brief.40  Goldmark, who served as chairman of the 
                                                        
 31.  Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 70–71 (1905) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (citing LUDWIG 
HIRT, DISEASES OF THE WORKERS (1871)). 
 32.   Id. at 70 (quoting LUDWIG HIRT, DISEASES OF THE WORKER (1871)). 
 33.  Id. (quoting LUDWIG HIRT, DISEASES OF THE WORKER (1871)). 
 34.  See PAUL KENS, LOCHNER V. NEW YORK: ECONOMIC REGULATION ON TRIAL 112–13 
(1998). 
 35.  Morag-Levine, supra note 23, at 87. 
 36.  83 U.S. 36 (1873). 
 37.  See Andrew Hamm, Barnett on Original Meaning and the Privileges or Immunities Clause, 
SCOTUSBLOG, (Nov. 5, 2015 2:43 PM), https://www.scotusblog.com/2015/11/barnett-on-original-
meaning-and-the-privileges-and-immunities-clause/ (describing a lecture delivered by Professor 
Randy Barnett to the Supreme Court Historical Society). 
 38.  Morag-Levine, supra note 23, at 85–88. 
 39.  It is also inaccurate to give Brandeis credit for inventing this strategy.  Most of the studies 
cited in the brief came from Europe, especially Great Britain, where reformers faced similar liber-
tarian opposition to labor legislation.  Scientific evidence reassured lawmakers that protecting work-
ers was necessary for the public good, as opposed to paternalism or class-based rent-seeking.  
Morag-Levine, supra note 23, at 88–93. 
 40.  See Vose, supra note 18, at 283 (noting Goldmark’s name did not appear on the Muller 
brief but was included (as second author) on the League’s subsequent briefs). 
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League’s Committee on Legislation,41 supervised a staff of readers who 
scoured several libraries looking for relevant evidence, which she subse-
quently summarized and synthesized.42 
Second, the term “Brandeis Brief” incorrectly suggests the National 
Consumers’ League only utilized this strategy once and for the sole benefit 
of the Court.  In reality, the League produced similar briefs in more than a 
dozen state and federal cases, nine of which reached the United States Su-
preme Court.43  The League continued to produce (even longer) briefs that 
were heavy on science and light on law long past Justice Louis Brandeis’s 
1916 appointment to the Supreme Court.  Felix Frankfurter then took over as 
the League’s lead counsel.  The League also viewed its briefs as an oppor-
tunity to engage with a wider audience regarding the need for progressive 
reform.  It sought grant funding to finance donations of its briefs to lawyers 
and university libraries.44  The League’s brief in Adkins v. Children’s Hospi-
tal ran to 1138 pages and cost nearly $7000 to print several hundred copies!45 
Third, the scientific information included in the Muller brief would not 
be considered reliable by modern standards.  The brief typically included 
short, conclusory statements made by doctors and other experts without much 
context as to the study’s design.  These statements were often sweeping in 
their assessment yet lacking in specificity.  Here is a typical example from a 
British physician, “The most common effect I have noticed of the long hours 
is general deterioration of health; very general symptoms which we medically 
attribute to over-action, and debility of the nervous system; that includes a 
great deal more than what is called nervous disease, such as indigestion, con-
stipation, a general slackness, and a great many other indefinite symptoms.” 46 
The problem with substandard science is that it may provide a false jus-
tification for a legal conclusion.  Consider Progressive-era reforms to the 
death penalty.  In 1898, New York became the first state to mandate the use 
of the electric chair, following several botched hangings in the 1880s.  Dr. 
Albert Southwick lobbied intensely for the law as a more humanitarian 
                                                        
 41.  Id. at 269. 
 42.  Id. at 278. 
 43.  Id. at 277 n.18 (citing Morehead v. New York ex rel. Tipaldo, 298 U.S. 587 (1936); Radice 
v. New York, 264 U.S. 292 (1924); Adkins v. Children’s Hosp., 261 U.S. 525 (1923); Stettler v. 
O’Hara, 243 U.S. 629 (1917) (per curiam); Bunting v. Oregon, 243 U.S. 426 (1917); Bosley v. 
McLaughlin, 236 U.S. 385 (1915); Miller v. Wilson, 236 U.S. 373 (1915); Hawley v. Walker, 232 
U.S. 718 (1914) (per curiam); Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 (1908); Gainer v. Dohrman, S.F. No. 
10, 990, Sup. Ct. Calif. (1924); People v. Elerding, 98 N.E. 982 (Ill. 1912); Ritchie v. Wayman, 91 
N.E. 695 (Ill. 1910); People v. Charles Schweinler Press, 108 N.E. 639 (N.Y. 1915)). 
 44.  Id. at 287–88; Morag-Levine, supra note 23, at 92–93. 
 45.  Vose, supra note 18, at 281. 
 46.  Brief for Defendant in Error at 18–19, Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 (1908) (No. 107) 
(quoting REPORT OF SELECT COMMITTEE ON SHOPS EARLY CLOSING BILL, BRITISH HOUSE OF 
COMMONS 215 (1895)). 
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method of execution.47  The only evidence Dr. Southwick could offer in sup-
port of his conclusion was that he had witnessed the accidental death of a 
man who had touched electrical wires.48 
William Kemmler, the first person to be sentenced to death by electro-
cution, brought an Eighth Amendment challenge.49  Thomas Edison testified 
at trial that a shock of 1000 volts of alternating current “would kill instantly, 
painlessly and in every case.”  Edison admitted he was not an expert on bio-
electricity, but his celebrity was more than persuasive.50  According to one 
legal historian, Edison’s assertion was “sufficient evidence of its truth.”51 
When Kemmler’s case reached the Supreme Court, Chief Justice Fuller 
wrote a unanimous opinion upholding the law.52  As in the Slaughterhouse 
Cases, the Court deferred to the judgment of the New York Legislature. 53  
Any notion that the electric chair provided an instant, painless death was dis-
proved immediately to any witness of Kemmler’s execution, which lasted 
eight horrific minutes.54  As a result of the Supreme Court’s decision, many 
other inmates suffered similarly gruesome fates on the electric chair over the 
next century.55 
Finally, the traditional myth assumes only progressives marshaled so-
cial science to advance their agenda.56  In 1908 (the same year as Muller), the 
Supreme Court upheld a Kentucky law that mandated segregation in private 
schools.57  Berea College, the only racially integrated university in the state, 
challenged the law on the grounds it interfered with its freedom of contract.58  
                                                        
 47.  Philip R. Nugent, Pulling the Plug on the Electric Chair: The Unconstitutionality of Elec-
trocution, 2 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 185, 190 (1993).  Ironically, while science now supports 
the notion that electrocution is a painful, undignified way to die, opposition to the New York law 
came from those who thought the electric chair would undermine the dignity of science!  Nicholas 
Ruddick, Life and Death by Electricity in 1890: The Transfiguration of William Kemmler, 21 J. AM. 
CULTURE 79, 80 (1998) (quoting an 1890 edition of Scientific American that opined it would be a 
“degradation of the noble science of electricity if it were brought down to so base a use as the killing 
of criminals”). 
 48.  Nugent, supra note 47, at 190. 
 49.  Id. at 190–91. 
 50.  Id. at 191. 
 51.  Id. at 191–92. 
 52.  In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436 (1890).  
 53.  Id. at 447. 
 54.  For a graphic description of Kemmler’s demise, see Ruddick, supra note 47, at 83–86. 
 55.  CRAIG BRANDON, THE ELECTRIC CHAIR: AN UNNATURAL AMERICAN HISTORY (2016). 
 56.  See also PAUL A. LOMBARDO, THREE GENERATIONS, NO IMBECILES: EUGENICS, THE 
SUPREME COURT, AND BUCK V. BELL ix–xv (2008) (describing the use of eugenics as scientific 
“evidence” in forced sterilization cases). 
 57.  Berea College v. Kentucky, 211 U.S. 45 (1908). 
 58.  See Hans J. Hacker & William D. Blake, The Neutrality Principle: The Hidden Yet Pow-
erful Legal Axiom at Work in Brown versus Board of Education, 8 BERKELEY J. AFR.-AM. L. & 
POL’Y 5, 18–20 (2006). 
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Kentucky countered that the law was needed to protect public health and 
safety under its police powers.59 
The State relied on a pseudo-scientific study that claimed black people 
were inherently less intelligent than white people.  Dr. Sanford B. Hunt 
reached this conclusion on the basis that the average black person’s brain 
weighed five ounces less than that of the average white person.60  The brief 
also cited an 1867 Pennsylvania Supreme Court segregation opinion, which 
stated, “The natural separation of the races is therefore an undeniable fact, 
and all social organizations which lead to their amalgamation are repugnant 
to the law of nature.  From social amalgamation it is but a step to illicit inter-
course, and but another to intermarriage.”61 
Outside of the context of race, the Lochner Era Court became increas-
ingly skeptical of whether state legislation achieved a constitutionally valid 
purpose.  Similarly, the Court frequently doubted whether federal economic 
regulations were legitimately related to the Commerce Clause62 or Taxing 
and Spending Clause.63  In 1937, after President Roosevelt threatened to pack 
the Court,64 the Justices reversed course, upholding a Washington minimum 
wage law for women65 and the National Labor Relations Act.66 
A year later, the Court went even further in redefining its role within the 
American constitutional system.  In United States v. Carolene Products 
                                                        
 59.  Id. at 20–21. 
 60.  Id. at 20. 
 61.  West Chester P.R. Co. v. Miles, 55 Pa. 209, 213 (1867). 
 62.  See, e.g., Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251 (1918) (striking down a federal ban on child 
labor). 
 63.  See, e.g., United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1 (1936) (striking down key provisions of the 
Agricultural Adjustment Act on states-rights grounds).  Butler represents the one major pre-New 
Deal economic decision not overruled in a subsequent case following the Revolution of 1937.  In-
stead, the Court distinguished Butler when it upheld the legitimacy of the Social Security Act in 
Steward Machine Co. v. Davis.  301 U.S. 548, 585 (1937) (holding “[t]he excise is not void as 
involving the coercion of the States in contravention of the Tenth Amendment”).  Federal power 
appeared to circumscribe state authority in United States v. Darby, when the Court held the Tenth 
Amendment does not deprive “the national government of authority to resort to all means for the 
exercise of a granted power which are appropriate and plainly adapted to the permitted end.”  312 
U.S. 100, 124 (1941).  However, Darby was a Commerce Clause case, and this principle was never 
extended to the Taxing and Spending Clause.  As a result, I contend Butler and Steward Machine 
Co. formed the jurisprudential basis for the states’ rights revival under the Rehnquist and Roberts 
Courts.  For example, Chief Justice Roberts relies heavily on Steward Machine Co.’s distinction 
between the federal government’s ability to pressure (not coerce) the states to strike the Medicaid 
provisions of the Affordable Care Act.  See Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sibelius, 567 U.S. 519, 
580–87 (2012); see also CASS R. SUNSTEIN, THE PARTIAL CONSTITUTION 292 (1993) (“[T]he un-
constitutional conditions doctrine should be abandoned. . . .  During the difficult transition from the 
common law system to the modern state, the doctrine represented an awkward and never fully ex-
plicated effort to protect constitutional rights in a dramatically different environment.”).  
 64.  Barry Cushman, Inside the “Constitutional Revolution” of 1937, SUP. CT. REV. 367, 381 
(2016). 
 65.  West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937). 
 66.  NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937). 
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Co.,67 the Court upheld a federal law banning the interstate shipment of 
“filled milk”—milk mixed with other oils or compounds.68  According to 
Footnote 4 of the opinion, “prejudice against discrete and insular minorities” 
may demand “searching judicial inquiry.”69  However, Justice Stone argued 
courts should be more deferential to elected officials in other types of cases.  
“[R]egulatory legislation affecting ordinary commercial transactions,” Jus-
tice Stone wrote, “is not to be pronounced unconstitutional unless in the light 
of the facts made known or generally assumed it is of such a character as to 
preclude the assumption that it rests upon some rational basis within the 
knowledge and experience of the legislators.”70  Footnote 4, thus, represented 
a reversal of the Court’s Lochner Era approach to economic rights and 
formed the basis for the Court’s modern scrutiny system in constitutional re-
view cases. 
B.  Post-New Deal Developments in Law and Social Science 
Why did the Supreme Court become more deferential when evaluating 
economic regulations?  One could argue that the modern rational basis test 
was not so modern, as it marked a return to the Court’s pre-Lochner Era ju-
risprudence.71  Professor Bruce Ackerman, on the other hand, has argued 
Footnote 4 was an important part of the New Deal constitutional revolution, 
expanding the legitimate reach of the federal government.72  Arguably, the 
Court’s new jurisprudence was also a function of its new personnel.  By 1938, 
two of the conservative “Four Horsemen,”73 Justices Van Devanter and Suth-
erland, had retired and were replaced by pro-New Deal Justices Hugo Black 
and Stanley Reed. 
I contend this jurisprudential shift also represents a new judicial under-
standing of the complexity of social problems and the institutional compe-
tencies required to solve them.  Footnote 4 recognized that judges lacked the 
training to diagnose economic problems and evaluate potential solutions to 
them.  The executive and legislative branches are large enough to hire policy 
experts who can leverage social science effectively.  For policy advice, Roo-
                                                        
 67.  304 U.S. 144 (1938). 
 68.  Id. at 145 n.1. 
 69.  Id. at 153 n.4. 
 70.  Id. at 152. 
 71.  See supra notes 31–33 and accompanying text. 
 72.  BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS 120 (1991) (“Carolene should be 
numbered amongst the transformative opinions which the modern republic uses to memorialize the 
constitutional solutions of the 1930’s.”). 
 73.  See BURT SOLOMON, FDR V. THE CONSTITUTION: THE COURT-PACKING FIGHT AND THE 
TRIUMPH OF DEMOCRACY 49 (2009). 
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sevelt famously relied on his “brain trust”: Raymond Moley (a political econ-
omist and law professor), Rex Tugwell (an economics professor), and Adolph 
Berle (a lawyer and business professor).74 
As the Supreme Court reoriented itself to post-New Deal America, so 
did the social sciences.  This Article focuses mostly on developments within 
political science, but other scholars have described similar transformations 
across related disciplines.75  At the beginning of the twentieth century, polit-
ical scientists valued scholarship not simply for its own sake, but as a tool to 
solve real-world political problems.  Research within the discipline often 
demonstrated “that the . . . system as set forth in the law is not always the 
same as the actual system.”76 
The reform-oriented mission of political science attracted both univer-
sity professors and educated laypeople.  When the American Political Sci-
ence Association launched in 1903, only twenty percent of its members were 
“professors and teachers.”77  Elected officials also sought out political scien-
tists for advice.  For example, President Roosevelt settled on court packing 
as a response to the Supreme Court’s opposition to the New Deal after exten-
sive consultations with Princeton University Professor Edward Corwin.78 
Beginning in the 1920s, some political scientists began protesting 
against the dominant research tradition, using historical and other interpre-
tivist methods to describe and analyze how governing institutions do and 
should function.  They sought to redefine the object of political science as 
“formulating and testing hypotheses, concerning uniformities of behavior in 
different institutional settings.”79  To accomplish this goal, according to a 
                                                        
 74.  ROBERT DALLEK, FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT: A POLITICAL LIFE 117–19 (2017).  Not that 
elected officials always make decisions using considered scientific judgment.  On one occasion in 
1933, President Roosevelt told Treasury Secretary Henry Morgenthau he wanted to raise gold prices 
by twenty-one cents.  When Morgenthau inquired why, Roosevelt replied, “Because ‘three times 
seven’ is a lucky number.”  Id. at 174.  Political scientists have noted that decisions like these con-
tinue to this day.  BRYAN D. JONES & WALTER WILLIAMS, THE POLITICS OF BAD IDEAS: THE 
GREAT TAX CUT DELUSION AND THE DECLINE OF GOOD GOVERNMENT IN AMERICA v–vi (2008). 
 75.  See, e.g., DOROTHY ROSS, THE ORIGINS OF AMERICAN SOCIAL SCIENCE 390 (1991) (“The 
sciences of liberal change that were forged during the second decade of [the twentieth] century 
captured substantial support in social science disciplines. . . . The self-conscious search for scien-
tific method . . . transformed the larger disciplinary traditions.”); B.F. Skinner, Behaviorism at Fifty, 
140 SCIENCE 951, 957 (1963) (discussing how “psychology has long been used for purposes of 
explanation” across the social sciences.). 
 76.  ROSS, supra note 75, at 274 (quoting FRANK J. GOODNOW, POLITICS AND 
ADMINISTRATION: A STUDY IN GOVERNMENT (1905)). 
 77.  Theodore J. Lowi, The State in Political Science: How We Become What We Study, 86 AM. 
POL. SCI. REV. 1, 1 (1992) (quoting ALBERT SOMIT & JOSEPH TANNENHAUS, THE DEVELOPMENT 
OF POLITICAL SCIENCE: FROM BURGESS TO BEHAVIORALISM 55 (1967)). 
 78.  SOLOMON, supra note 73, at 90. 
 79.  Robert A. Dahl, The Behavioral Approach in Political Science: Epitaph for a Monument 
to a Successful Protest, 55 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 763, 764 (1961) (emphasis omitted) (quoting 
ANNUAL REPORT OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCE RESEARCH COUNCIL (1945)).  Within political science, 
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1951 publication, a political behavioralist should seek answers to questions 
“in quantitative terms if [they] can and in qualitative terms if [they] must.”80  
While statistical theory was well-developed by the late nineteenth century, 81 
post-World War II technological advances made it easier (and cheaper) for 
political scientists to analyze larger datasets with more advanced statistical 
techniques.82 
Political scientist Theodore Lowi poses another rationale for behavior-
alism becoming dominant: it co-evolved with the New Deal.  “Science is an 
inherent part of the new, bureaucratized state,” Lowi argued, because of the 
post-New Deal commitment to making policy based on “scientific decision 
making.”83  Within political science, Lowi argued that the subfields of polit-
ical behavior, public policy, and formal theory became increasingly popular 
because of their “compatibility with bureaucratic thought-ways.”84  These 
disciplinary and governance changes required a commitment to quantitative 
methods because, as Professor Karl Manheim wrote, “Bureaucratic thought 
is permeated by measurement.”85 
The post-New Deal approaches to social science and law famously in-
tersected in Footnote 11 of Brown v. Board of Education.86  Chief Justice 
Warren included the footnote in support of his conclusion, “Separate educa-
tional facilities are inherently unequal.”87  Although this footnote subse-
quently became a major source of controversy,88 Chief Justice Warren said 
he included it as merely an afterthought.89  This rationale is entirely plausible.  
As noted in Part II of this Article, Brown v. Board of Education is the only 
opinion in which Chief Justice Warren cites social scientific research.90  The 
                                                        
behavioralists study, among other phenomena, why individuals join political parties, vote for can-
didates, and hold opinions on political issues.  See THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF POLITICAL 
BEHAVIOR (Russell J. Dalton & Hans-Dieter Klingemann eds., 2009). 
 80.  Dahl, supra note 79, at 767–68 (emphasis omitted) (quoting David Truman, Items, SOC. 
SCI. RES. COUNCIL 37 (1951)). 
 81.  Lowi, supra note 77, at 3. 
 82.  John M. Chambers, Statistical Computing: History and Trends, 34 AM. STAT’N 238, 238 
(1980) (“[R]adically cheaper and smaller devices for processing and memory . . . are certain to pro-
vide major opportunities and challenges for the use of computers in statistics.”). 
 83.  Lowi, supra note 77, at 3. 
 84.  Id.  Formal theory refers to the use of game theory as a method to derive hypotheses under 
rationalistic assumptions.  See Paul E. Johnson, Formal Theories of Politics: Mathematical Model-
ling in Political Science, 12 MATHEMATICAL AND COMPUTER MODELLING 397 (1989). 
 85.  Lowi, supra note 77, at 3 (quoting KARL MANNHEIM, IDEOLOGY AND UTOPIA 167 (1936)). 
 86.  347 U.S. 483, 494 n.11 (1954).  
 87.  Id. at 495. 
 88.  See Sanjay Mody, Brown Footnote Eleven in Historical Context: Social Science and the 
Supreme Court’s Quest for Legitimacy, 54 STAN. L. REV. 793, 803–14 (2002) (describing the on-
going controversy over Footnote 11). 
 89.  RICHARD KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE: THE HISTORY OF BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION 
AND BLACK AMERICA’S STRUGGLE FOR EQUALITY 706 (2004) (noting Warren later incredulously 
stated, “It was only a note, after all.”). 
 90.  See infra Table 2, Section II.B. 
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footnote consisted of seven references to studies conducted by both white and 
black scholars.  Two of the references were surveys of social scientists who 
largely agreed segregation harms the development of black students.91 
Most prominently, Footnote 11 included two references to the studies 
(the “Doll Studies”) conducted by Dr. Kenneth Clark, a City University of 
New York psychologist.92  Dr. Clark interviewed male and female black chil-
dren between the ages of three and seven.  Each child viewed two otherwise 
identical infant dolls, one of which was white, the other black.  Dr. Clark 
requested the children show him a doll that matched a qualification, including 
“the doll you like best,” the “nice doll,” the doll that “looks bad,” and the doll 
that “looks like you.”  Across each age group, children were significantly 
more likely to associate the white doll with positive characteristics and the 
black doll with looking “bad.”93 
The notoriety Footnote 11 has achieved makes its origin story even more 
interesting.94  When the NAACP was preparing to bring Brown to the Court, 
they approached Dr. Clark for assistance in grounding their legal argument 
in social science data.95  The NAACP wanted to counter Justice Brown’s ob-
servation in Plessy v. Ferguson96 that segregation only creates a badge of 
inferiority if “the colored race chooses to put that construction upon it.”97  Dr. 
Clark’s research could, as he put it, “demonstrate subtle or psychological 
damage to black youngsters from segregation.”98  The Appendix to the 
NAACP’s briefs analyzed data from forty-nine studies conducted by Dr. 
Clark and many other scientists.99 
That educational segregation existed in Topeka, Kansas, was easy to di-
agnose, as there was a state statute requiring separate school systems.100  In 
subsequent cases, states and school boards seeking to avoid compliance with 
                                                        
 91.  347 U.S. at 494 n.11 (citing Isidor Chein, What Are the Psychological Effects of Segrega-
tion Under Conditions of Equal Facilities?, 3 INT’L J. OPINION & ATTITUDE RES. 229–34 (1949); 
Max Deutscher & Isidor Chein, The Psychological Effects of Enforced Segregation: A Survey of 
Social Science Opinion, 26 J. PSYCHOL. 259 (1948)). 
 92.  Id. (citing KENNETH B. CLARK, EFFECT OF PREJUDICE AND DISCRIMINATION ON 
PERSONALITY DEVELOPMENT (1950)). 
 93.  Darlene Powell-Hopson & Derek S. Hopson, Implications of Doll Color Preferences 
Among Black Preschool Children and White Preschool Children, 14 J. BLACK PSYCHOL. 57, 58 
(1988). 
 94.  E.g., WHAT BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION SHOULD HAVE SAID: THE NATION’S TOP 
LEGAL EXPERTS REWRITE AMERICA’S LANDMARK CIVIL RIGHTS DECISION 50–51 (Jack Balkin 
ed., 2001). 
 95.  MARK A. CHESLER, JOSEPH SANDERS & DEBRA S. KALMUSS, SOCIAL SCIENCE IN COURT: 
MOBILIZING EXPERTS IN THE SCHOOL DESEGREGATION CASES 17–19 (1988). 
 96.  163 U.S. 537 (1896). 
 97.  Id. at 551. 
 98.  CHESLER ET AL., supra note 95, at 19. 
 99.  Appendix to Appellants’ Briefs at 20–24, Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954) 
(Nos. 8, 101, 191). 
 100.  See Brown, 347 U.S. at 486 n.1. 
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Brown became more sophisticated in hiding their discriminatory acts.  Con-
sequently, plaintiffs relied on more complex statistics to prove their case.  As 
part of the decree to integrate public schools in Washington, D.C., the plain-
tiffs asked the court to equalize the per-pupil spending on every item in the 
school budget.101  Both the plaintiff and the school board hired economists to 
argue whether neighborhood income in the city was positively or negatively 
correlated with school expenditures.  The answer depended upon which sta-
tistical technique was employed: Pearson correlation or Spearman correla-
tion.102 
Judge J. Skelly Wright became increasingly frustrated with the scientific 
data debated in the lawsuit.  When he issued his opinion, he declared, “[T]he 
unfortunate if inevitable tendency has been to lose sight of the disadvantaged 
young students on whose behalf this suit was first brought in an overgrown 
garden of numbers and charts and jargon like ‘standard deviation of the var-
iable,’ statistical ‘significance,’ and ‘Pearson product moment correla-
tions.’”103  Instead, Judge Wright stated, “The conclusion I reach is based 
upon burden of proof, and upon straightforward moral and constitutional 
arithmetic.”104  Constitutional arithmetic may seem straightforward to some 
judges, but debates over appropriate statistical techniques in the social sci-
ences today are even more complex than which form of a correlation coeffi-
cient an analyst should employ. 
C.  Judicial Misunderstanding of Science and the Potential for 
Ideologically-Motivated Reasoning 
Josephine Goldmark, Justice Louis Brandeis, and Justice Felix Frank-
furter wanted to mediate the Lochner Court’s conservatism, using scientific 
                                                        
 101.  Hobson v. Hansen, 327 F. Supp. 844, 844 (D.D.C. 1971). 
 102.  DONALD L. HOROWITZ, THE COURTS AND SOCIAL POLICY 126 (1977).  A correlation co-
efficient measures the extent to which two variables tend to change together.  Correlation values of 
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AL., AN INTRODUCTION TO STATISTICAL ANALYSIS IN RESEARCH: WITH APPLICATIONS IN THE 
BIOLOGICAL AND LIFE SCIENCES 435–71 (2018). 
 103.  Hobson, 327 F. Supp. at 859. 
 104.  Id.  
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evidence to steer the Justices to a legally correct (liberal) outcome in labor 
cases.  History has demonstrated, however, that as quantitative social science 
becomes more methodologically rigorous, it becomes more likely that 
judges, who lack statistical training, may be unable to evaluate the quality of 
the research they cite.  Moreover, judges may not understand whether the 
scientific findings support the legal conclusions they draw from them.105  If 
these mistakes occur frequently, social science is unlikely to have this medi-
ating effect on judicial decisionmaking.  Instead, social science could become 
another tool fueling ideological polarization on the Court.106 
Chief Justice Warren is arguably guilty of making both types of mis-
takes in Footnote 11.  Even by the scientific standards of the mid-twentieth 
century, the research cited in Brown was not particularly well-designed.  For 
example, surveying social scientists about their views on segregation is not 
nearly as helpful as administering a survey to black (and white) children.  
Other social scientists criticized the question wording and sampling proce-
dures of these surveys.107 
Dr. Clark’s Doll Studies suffered from a small sample size and no con-
trol group.108  It is also possible that Dr. Clark over-concluded from his data.  
For example, only sixty-one percent of the three-year-old respondents cor-
rectly identified the brown doll as the one that “looks like you.”109  If nearly 
half the sample cannot relate their skin color to the skin color of the doll, 
what does it mean when these children associate the white doll as being “the 
nice doll”? 
More importantly, Justice Warren cited this research in support of the 
proposition that state-sanctioned discrimination psychologically harms black 
children.  However, the Doll Studies did not identify the causal mechanism 
that creates this lack of self-esteem.  Other research undermined the assump-
tion that state-mandated segregation created this effect.  An earlier Doll Study 
conducted by Dr. Clark compared the behavior of black children in Arkansas 
to those in Massachusetts, where de jure school segregation did not exist. 110  
The black children in Massachusetts were even more likely to prefer the 
white doll than the children in Arkansas.111 
                                                        
 105.  See also Michael Rustad & Thomas Koenig, The Supreme Court and Junk Social Science: 
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Even Justices who enjoy engaging with science may badly misinterpret 
it.  According to a former law clerk, Justice William Brennan had a “certain 
fascination with science and technology,”112 and he cited scientific studies in 
more opinions than any other Justice analyzed in this Article.113  Nonetheless, 
his enthusiasm did not serve him well in Craig v. Boren,114 a challenge to an 
Oklahoma law that set the legal age for purchasing so-called “3.2% beer” at 
eighteen for women and twenty-one for men.  The State justified the law as 
a means of reducing drunk driving and highway accidents, but the Court in-
validated the law on Equal Protection grounds by a 7-2 vote. 
Justice Brennan’s majority opinion doubted both the accuracy and rele-
vance of scientific evidence the State offered in defense of the law.115  Re-
garding the most relevant scientific information, Justice Brennan wrote, 
[T]he statistics broadly establish that [0].18% of females and 2% 
of males [aged eighteen to twenty years old in the state of Okla-
homa] were arrested for [driving under the influence of alcohol in 
September-December, 1973].  While such a disparity is not trivial 
in a statistical sense, it hardly can form the basis for employment 
of a gender line as a classifying device.  Certainly[,] if maleness is 
to serve as a proxy for drinking and driving, a correlation of 2% 
must be considered an unduly tenuous “fit.”116 
Justice Brennan made three major mistakes in this passage.  First of all, 
there is no correlational analysis taking place, so the term “correlation” is not 
appropriate.  Second, he mistakes the concepts of statistical significance, 
which tests whether a finding is a “statistical fluke” caused by measurement 
error, for substantive significance, which evaluates whether a finding has 
real-world import.117  Finally, the substantive significance of the difference 
in arrest rates for men and women is massive, not merely “not trivial.”  Iron-
ically, Justice Rehnquist, who cites science in only 0.7 percent of his opin-
ions,118 provides a much better interpretation of this finding in his dissent: 
“[M]ales in the [eighteen to twenty year old] age group were arrested for 
                                                        
 112.  Dean M. Hashimoto, Justice Brennan’s Use of Scientific and Empirical Evidence in Con-
stitutional and Administrative Law, 32 B.C. L. REV. 739, 740 (1991). 
 113.  See infra Table 2, Section II.B. 
 114.  429 U.S. 1904 (1976). 
 115.  Id. at 199–204. 
 116.  Id. at 201–02.   
 117.  In Craig, one cannot conclude whether the gender difference in arrest rates is statistically 
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 118.  See infra Table 2, Section II.B.   
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‘driving under the influence’ almost [eighteen] times as often as their female 
counterparts.”119 
Justice Brennan formed a bizarre conclusion concerning the limitations 
of the State’s data.  He claimed the higher arrest rate for men aged eighteen 
to twenty years old may be evidence of “the relative futility of controlling 
driving behavior by the 3.2% beer statute and like legislation.”120  This seems 
equivalent to saying that since men are disproportionately more likely to be 
arrested for committing murder,121 the laws punishing murder are futile, and, 
by extension, raise Equal Protection concerns.  Moreover, it is puzzling as to 
why Justice Brennan would spend several pages critiquing the State’s data 
before stating, “It is unrealistic to expect either members of the judiciary or 
state officials to be well versed in the rigors of experimental or statistical 
technique.”122 
Professor Ronald Dworkin echoed this perspective towards quantitative 
data in judicial opinions.123  However, he also argued judges should rely on 
qualitative studies in their decisionmaking.  He noted, “Controversial causal 
judgments based on statistical theory lie outside the normal competence of 
courts . . . .  But the role of interpretive judgment should not be reduced.”124  
Judges, Dworkin argued, are well-positioned to understand the quality and 
implications of an anthropology study that, for example, evaluates whether a 
rain dance in an indigenous tribe “is religious rather than technological in its 
meaning.”125 
Dworkin hoped to recreate the relationship between social science and 
judging that existed when Goldmark, Justice Brandeis, and Justice Frankfur-
ter were writing their briefs.  This plea failed to recognize that one cannot go 
home again.  Absent a social scientific revolution that reinvigorates qualita-
tive methods as the dominant form of scholarship (or a revolution in legal 
education),126 using social science in judicial decisions will be fraught with 
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empirical and normative difficulties.  As discussed in the next section, ordi-
nary citizens do not fully understand how the scientific method works.  This 
lack of understanding creates a willingness to support only those scientific 
conclusions that comport with their political worldview.  If judges are simi-
larly “in over their heads” when it comes to evaluating social science, they 
may fall victim to the same kind of ideologically-motivated reasoning. 
II.  USING SOCIAL SCIENCE TO PREDICT THE USE OF SOCIAL SCIENCE IN 
SUPREME COURT OPINIONS 
Why might Supreme Court Justices make scientific appeals?  This Part 
considers different incentives that make some Justices more likely to refer-
ence scientific studies than others and make some cases more likely to feature 
scientific appeals.  Finally, this Part considers whether science might polarize 
or mediate the effect of ideology on judicial decisionmaking.  The major the-
ories of judicial behavior within political science inform the development of 
these hypotheses.  Section II.A discusses the three major theories of judicial 
behavior: (1) the attitudinal model; (2) the strategic model; and (3) the legal 
model.  The attitudinal model forms the basis for the “Judicial Liberalism 
Hypothesis” and “Science Major Hypothesis.”  The strategic model of judi-
cial behavior yields the “Case Salience Hypothesis” and the “Ideological Po-
larization Hypothesis,” while the “Ideological Moderation Hypothesis” de-
rives from the legal model.  Finally, Section II.B, provides background on 
the data gathered to test these hypotheses. 
A.  Theory and Hypotheses 
1.  The Attitudinal Model of Judicial Decisionmaking 
The behavioral revolution, described in Section I.B, took hold more 
quickly in some subfields of political science than others.  The last to embrace 
the behavioral approach was public law.  Professor Harold Spaeth com-
plained about the state of scientific research on the Court in the mid-1960s, 
arguing, “Until recent years, analysis of Supreme Court . . . decision-making 
had hewed exclusively to the line of literary criticism; it was subjective, im-
pressionistic, and nonreplicable.”127  Spaeth, along with Professor Jeffrey 
                                                        
 127.  HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE WARREN COURT: CASES AND COMMENTARY 15 (1966).  Ironi-
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Segal, developed the attitudinal model of judicial behavior, which assumes 
Justices are single-minded seekers of legal policy.  Each Justice’s ideology 
determines what kind of legal policy they seek.128  Segal and Spaeth, writing 
in 2002, conclude, “Simply put, Rehnquist votes the way he does because he 
is extremely conservative; [Thurgood] Marshall voted the way he did because 
he was extremely liberal.”129 
The attitudinal model suggests rival hypotheses when it comes to the 
relationship between a Justice’s ideology and his or her willingness to make 
scientific appeals.  Proponents of the attitudinal model view the content of 
judicial opinions as nothing more than a post hoc rationalization of a Justice’s 
ideology.  From this standpoint, ideology may not have any predictable rela-
tionship to the decision to cite science because science does not provide ide-
ologically-reliable answers to social or legal problems.  Justices on both the 
left and the right will cite science that supports their worldview. 
One fascinating new public opinion study supports the notion that indi-
viduals seek scientific information that comports with their ideological 
worldview.  Researchers analyzed Amazon transactions in which an individ-
ual purchased a “political” book (subsequently classified as either liberal or 
conservative) and at least one other book.  The study did not find Democrats 
were more interested in science as a companion book purchase compared to 
Republicans.  In fact, science books were co-purchased at a higher rate than 
any other genre.  The science book purchasing habits of Democrats and Re-
publicans were different, however, in regard to the scientific fields and per-
spectives within those fields they selected.  In other words, it appears as 
though both conservatives and liberals who enjoy reading are open to learn-
ing more about science, so long as it confirms their underlying worldview. 130 
                                                        
outcomes on a dependent variable is, by definition, impressionistic.  Finally, Segal and Spaeth 
acknowledge the attitudinal model cannot explain unanimous Supreme Court votes.  Id. at 343 n.81.  
Thus, their model is non-replicable in roughly thirty-six percent of Supreme Court cases every term.  
Sarah Tuberville & Anthony Marcum, Those 5-to-4 Decisions on the Supreme Court? 9 to 0 Is Far 
More Common., WASH. POST (June 28, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/postevery-
thing/wp/2018/06/28/those-5-4-decisions-on-the-supreme-court-9-0-is-far-more-common/. 
 128.  SEGAL & SPAETH, supra note 127. 
 129.  Id. at 86. 
 130.  Shi et al., supra note 13.  One caveat to the generalizability of this study is that it is limited 
to individuals who want to learn about both politics and science.  Individuals with higher levels of 
political knowledge behave with much greater sophistication than less informed voters.  See 
MICHAEL X. DELLI CARPINI & SCOTT KEETER, WHAT AMERICANS KNOW ABOUT POLITICS AND 
WHY IT MATTERS (1996). 
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On the other hand, other studies have found that conservative citizens 
are less trusting of scientists in general131 and skeptical of evidence support-
ing scientific issues like climate change132 and evolution.133  One possible 
causal mechanism is that differences in personality types have ideological 
consequences.  Compared to conservatives, liberals tend to be significantly 
more open to new information and experiences,134 one of the so-called “Big-
Five” personality traits.135  Individuals with higher openness scores may trust 
scientists more because they are more curious about scientific questions.  Ju-
dicial politics scholars have found a similar relationship between openness 
as a personality trait and liberalism among Supreme Court Justices.136  Thus, 
I predict liberal Justices will be more likely to cite science in their opinions 
than conservatives (Judicial Liberalism Hypothesis). 
Ideology is a product of a Justice’s demographic characteristics (for ex-
ample, race, gender, religion, and age) and life experiences (for example, 
economic status, education, or prior work experience).  These social forces 
can also exert an independent effect on judicial decisionmaking.  For exam-
ple, Catholic Supreme Court Justices tend to support the Catholic position on 
legal issues, even after controlling for judicial ideology.137  Judicial politics 
scholars, however, have not devoted much attention to the effect of a Justice’s 
undergraduate major. 
Justices who have greater familiarity with the scientific method as a re-
sult of their education may feel more comfortable referencing social science 
in their opinions.138  One study found that high school math performance did 
not affect what major a college student selected.139  Rather, the presence of 
negative feelings towards math made students significantly more likely to 
choose a humanities major over a social science field.  If a negative affect 
                                                        
 131.  Cacciatore et al., supra note 12, at 18. 
 132.  Ana-Maria Bliuc et al., Public Division About Climate Change Rooted in Conflicting So-
cio-political Identities, 5 NAT. CLIMATE CHANGE 226–29 (2015). 
 133.  Jonathan P. Hill, Rejecting Evolution: The Role of Religion, Education, and Social Net-
works, 53 J. SCI. STUDY RELIGION 575, 576 (2014). 
 134.  See, e.g., Jan-Emmanuel De Neve, Personality, Childhood Experience, and Political Ide-
ology, 36 POL. PSYCHOL. 55, 55 (2014). 
 135.  See Lewis R. Goldberg, An Alternative “Description of Personality”: The Big-Five Factor 
Structure, 59 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1216, 1217 (1990). 
 136.  MATTHEW E. K. HALL, WHAT JUSTICES WANT: GOALS AND PERSONALITY ON THE U.S. 
SUPREME COURT 47–48 (2018). 
 137.  William Blake, God Save This Honorable Court: Religion as a Source of Judicial Policy 
Preferences, 65 POL. RES. Q. 814, 814–15 (2012). 
 138.  This would be consistent with a study that found science majors are significantly more 
knowledgeable about climate change than college graduates who majored in other fields.  Joanna 
K. Huxster, Ximena Uribe-Zarain & Willett Kempton, Undergraduate Understanding of Climate 
Change: The Influences of College Major and Environmental Group Membership on Survey 
Knowledge Scores, 46 J. ENVTL. EDUC. 149, 158 (2015). 
 139.  Yingyi Ma, Family Socioeconomic Status, Parental Involvement, and College Major 
Choices—Gender, Race/Ethnic, and Nativity Patterns, 52 SOC. PERSP. 211, 222–23 (2009). 
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towards math is long lasting, it could make people more reticent to engage 
with quantitative scientific research later in life.  The Science Major Hypoth-
esis predicts that Justices who earned a bachelor’s degree in a scientific field 
will be more likely to invoke science in their opinions than Justices who stud-
ied other subjects.140 
The following Justices, whose behavior is analyzed in Section III, com-
pleted a degree in a social science field or mathematics:141  Samuel Alito 
(Public and International Affairs),142 Harry Blackmun (Math),143 William 
Brennan (Economics),144 Stephen Breyer (Politics, Philosophy, and Econom-
ics),145 William Douglas (Economics),146 Neil Gorsuch (Political Science), 147 
John Harlan (Government),148 Anthony Kennedy (Political Science),149 San-
dra Day O’Connor (Economics),150 Stanley Reed (Economics),151 William 
Rehnquist (Political Science),152 Earl Warren (Political Science),153 Byron 
                                                        
 140.  Interestingly, Ronald Reagan gave a speech in which he appeared to link the Judicial Lib-
eralism Hypothesis and the Science Major Hypothesis.  At a 1986 event in North Carolina, he stated 
Democrats “allow drugs, thugs and hoodlums to pervade society by placing a bunch of sociology 
majors on the bench.”  Ronald J. Ostrow & James Gerstenzang, Reagan, Bork Foe in Sharp Ex-
change: President’s Accusation of Dishonesty Hit by Sen. Sanford as ‘Slanderous’, L.A. TIMES 
(Oct. 15, 1987), https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-1987-10-15-mn-14322-story.html. 
 141.  Justice Hugo Black is not included on this list.  While he attended medical school for one 
year, Justice Black did not complete his degree.  ROGER K. NEWMAN, HUGO BLACK: A BIOGRAPHY 
17 (1994). 
 142.  Samuel Alito, BALLOTPEDIA, https://ballotpedia.org/Samuel_Alito (last visited Apr. 16, 
2019). 
 143.  Paul Nelson, Blackmun, Harry A. (1908–1999), MNOPEDIA (Oct. 18, 2017), 
http://www.mnopedia.org/person/blackmun-harry-1908-1999. 
 144.  See NAT HENTOFF, LIVING THE BILL OF RIGHTS: HOW TO BE AN AUTHENTIC AMERICAN 
31 (1999). 
 145.  Caplan, supra note 10. 
 146.  Building Upon a Legacy of Law, WHITMAN MAG. (July 2012), https://www.whit-
man.edu/newsroom/whitman-magazine/2012/july-2012/campaign-update/building-upon-a-legacy-
of-law. 
 147.  Neil Gorsuch, OYEZ, https://www.oyez.org/justices/neil_gorsuch (last visited Apr. 16, 
2019). 
 148.  E-mail from Sara Logue, Assistant Univ. Archivist for Pub. Servs., Seeley G. Mudd Man-
uscript Library, Princeton Univ. (Mar. 19, 2019) (on file with author). 
 149.  Anthony Kennedy Biography, BIOGRAPHY.COM (Apr. 2, 2014), https://www.biog-
raphy.com/law-figure/anthony-kennedy. 
 150.  Sandra Day O’Connor, OYEZ, https://www.oyez.org/justices/sandra_day_oconnor (last 
visited Apr. 16, 2019). 
 151.  Gracie Hale, Ted Gilson & Ruth Bryan, Stanley Forman Reed Papers, U. KY., https://ex-
ploreuk.uky.edu/fa/findingaid/?id=xt700000032b (last visited Apr. 17, 2019). 
 152.  William H. Rehnquist, OYEZ, https://www.oyez.org/justices/william_h_rehnquist (last vis-
ited Apr. 16, 2019). 
 153.  Biography of Earl Warren, EARL WARREN C., 
https://warren.ucsd.edu/about/biography.html (last visited Apr. 16, 2019). 
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White (Economics).154  Some of these Justices also received a bachelor’s in 
a humanities field, but this does not change the coding scheme.155 
2.  The Strategic Model of Judicial Decisionmaking 
The strategic model of judicial decisionmaking also typically assumes 
Justices are only interested in shaping legal policy, but they pursue this goal 
in light of institutional constraints, the preferences of other Justices, and the 
expectations of external actors.156  For example, a Justice would need to 
weigh their policy preferences against the possibility of non-compliance with 
a sincerely-written opinion.  Alternatively, perhaps a Justice would want to 
wait until public opinion was on their side before pushing the law in a certain 
direction. 
Only within the last fifteen years or so did scholars begin to examine 
Supreme Court opinions as potential data sources.  Studies have found Jus-
tices use framing devices in their opinions to support their point of view.  
Justices make strategic references to the Federalist Papers157 and other rhe-
torical sources, such as Blackstone’s Commentaries, the Magna Carta, the 
Declaration of Independence, and the opinions of Chief Justice Marshall. 158  
They even vary in their tendencies to cite precedent159 and amicus curiae 
briefs,160 depending on the context of a case.  None of these studies, however, 
has examined the conditions under which Justices reference science in their 
opinions. 
                                                        
 154.  CU-Boulder Chancellor, President, Law School Dean Laud Scholar-Athlete Byron White, 
CU BOULDER TODAY (Apr. 14, 2002), https://www.colorado.edu/today/2002/04/14/cu-boulder-
chancellor-president-law-school-dean-laud-scholar-athlete-byron-white. 
 155.  For example, Justice Breyer received an A.B. in philosophy from Harvard in addition to 
his PPE degree from Oxford.  Caplan, supra note 10.   
 156.  LEE EPSTEIN & JACK KNIGHT, THE CHOICES JUSTICES MAKE 10 (1998) (“[J]ustices may 
be primarily seekers of legal policy, but they are not unconstrained actors who make decisions based 
only on their own ideological attitudes.”).  More recent scholarship has acknowledged Justices have 
multiple goals, like job satisfaction.  See LEE EPSTEIN, WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. 
POSNER, THE BEHAVIOR OF FEDERAL JUDGES: A THEORETICAL AND EMPIRICAL STUDY OF 
RATIONAL CHOICE (2013).  Describing their earlier account of the strategic model Epstein and 
Knight admitted, “We were wrong. . . . [Policy] is not the only motivation; it may not even be dom-
inant for many judges.”  Lee Epstein & Jack Knight, Reconsidering Judicial Preferences, 16 ANN. 
REV. POL. SCI. 11, 12 (2013). 
 157.  Pamela C. Corley, Robert M. Howard & David C. Nixon, The Supreme Court and Opinion 
Content: The Use of the Federalist Papers, 58 POL. RES. Q. 329 (2005). 
 158.  Robert J. Hume, The Use of Rhetorical Sources by the U.S. Supreme Court, 40 LAW & 
SOC’Y REV. 817, 822–24 (2006). 
 159.  Yonatan Lupu & James H. Fowler, Strategic Citations to Precedent on the U.S. Supreme 
Court, 42 J. LEGAL STUD. 151 (2013). 
 160.  Paul M. Collins Jr., Amici Curiae and Dissensus on the U.S. Supreme Court, 5 J. 
EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 143 (2008). 
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Science offers a tool to persuade other Justices or make an opinion seem 
more legitimate in the eyes of external actors.  In particular, science can dis-
guise the ideological conclusion the author reaches because science provides 
non-ideological reasoning.  Citing science also puts Justices on the opposing 
side of the case in the uncomfortable position of refuting the scientific evi-
dence or denying its relevance.  Thus, I predict that Justices will be more 
likely to cite science in opinions that are consistent with their ideology (Ide-
ological Polarization Hypothesis). 
The salience of a particular case also shapes how Justices write their 
opinions.  References to the Federalist Papers and other rhetorical sources 
occur more frequently in cases in which the Court strikes down a law, over-
turns a precedent, or decides cases with a closely divided vote.  Justices may 
feel the need to leverage as many arguments as they can in more important 
cases.  This may explain why scholars have found Supreme Court opinions 
are significantly longer in salient cases, which they define as those reported 
on the front page of the New York Times.161 
Three notable examples illustrate the connection between long opinions 
and making appeals to science.  Justice Breyer referenced relevant scientific 
evidence in an appendix following his dissenting opinion in United States v. 
Lopez (citing 123 non-governmental studies and reports connecting school 
violence to economic productivity),162 Brown v. Entertainment Merchants 
Ass’n (citing 150 peer-reviewed studies outlining the psychological risks to 
children posed by violent video games),163 and McDonald v. City of Chica-
go164 (citing seven peer-reviewed studies on the public safety threats posed 
by gun ownership).  In two of these cases, Lopez165 and McDonald,166 Justice 
Breyer read his dissent from the bench, which is a signal of a Justice’s pro-
found disagreement with the majority.167  Prior scholarship has found that 
dissenting from the bench frequently occurs in salient cases.168 
Thus, the Case Salience Hypothesis predicts that Justices are signifi-
cantly more likely to reference social science studies in more important cases.  
                                                        
 161.  Ryan C. Black & James F. Spriggs II, An Empirical Analysis of the Length of U.S. Supreme 
Court Opinions, 45 HOUS. L. REV. 621, 648, 657–58, 665, 674 (2008).  For an analysis of why 
making the front page of the New York Times constitutes a valid measure of case salience, see Lee 
Epstein & Jeffrey A. Segal, Measuring Issue Salience, 44 AM. J. POL. SCI. 66, 72 (2000). 
 162.  514 U.S. 549, 631–44 (1995) (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 163.  564 U.S. 786, 858–72 (2011) (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 164.  561 U.S. 742, 941–44 (2010) (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 165.  United States v. Lopez, OYEZ, https://www.oyez.org/cases/1994/93-1260 (last visited Apr. 
23, 2019).  
 166.  McDonald v. Chicago, OYEZ, https://www.oyez.org/cases/2009/08-1521 (last visited Apr 
23, 2019). 
 167.  William D. Blake & Hans J. Hacker, “The Brooding Spirit of the Law”: Supreme Court 
Justices Reading Dissents from the Bench, 31 JUST. SYS. J. 1, 2 (2010). 
 168.  Id. at 9. 
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In my analysis, I operationalize salience using several criteria: cases involv-
ing judicial review, holding a law unconstitutional, overturning a precedent, 
being decided by a closely divided vote, receiving heavier media coverage, 169 
or featuring a larger number of amicus briefs.170 
3.  The Legal Model of Judicial Decisionmaking 
The legal model of judicial behavior is usually portrayed as a straw man 
against which attitudinalists can claim the empirical high ground.171  For ex-
ample, in the first chapter of The Supreme Court and the Attitudinal Model 
Revisited, political scientists Jeffrey Segal and Harold Spaeth use the word 
“naïve” four times to characterize the notion that Supreme Court Justices are 
not policymakers.172  Subsequent quantitative political science scholarship 
has taken the legal model more seriously, uncovering evidence that legal doc-
trine constrains judicial ideology. 
Political scientists Michael Bailey and Forrest Maltzman find evidence 
that stare decisis constrains every member of the Court.  This commitment is 
even higher among Justices with prior judicial experience.  The Justices also 
defer to the elected branches, but many times it is not out of fear of retaliation, 
but a normative concern for a properly limited judicial role.173  Another study 
finds appellate court judges act much less ideologically when citing binding 
precedent than nonbinding precedents set by different circuits.174  In other 
words, appellate judges seek out arguments from other circuits that support 
their worldview when they can, but when they must follow binding precedent 
that goes against their worldview, they do so. 
Other scholars have found Supreme Court cases that provide more legal 
certainty are more likely to be decided unanimously.175  If scientific evidence, 
like that provided in the Brandeis Brief, can provide more information, and 
                                                        
 169.  See Richard L. Pacelle Jr. et al., Assessing the Influence of Amicus Curiae Briefs on the 
Roberts Court, 99 SOC. SCI. Q. 1253 (2018). 
 170.  See Ryan Salzman, Christopher J. Williams & Bryan T. Calvin, The Determinants of the 
Number of Amicus Briefs Filed Before the U.S. Supreme Court, 1953-2001, 32 JUST. SYS. J. 293 
(2011). 
 171.  See Gerald N. Rosenberg, Symposium: The Supreme Court and the Attitudinal Model, 4 
LAW & CTS. NEWSLETTER  6 (1994), http://lawcourts.org/pubs/newsletter/spring94.pdf (last visited 
Aug. 25, 2019); Rogers M. Smith, Symposium: The Supreme Court and the Attitudinal Model, 4 
LAW & CTS. NEWSLETTER 8 (1994), http://lawcourts.org/pubs/newsletter/spring94.pdf (last visited 
Aug. 25, 2019). 
 172.  SEGAL & SPAETH, supra note 127, at 7–8. 
 173.  See MICHAEL A. BAILEY & FORREST MALTZMAN, THE CONSTRAINED COURT: LAW, 
POLITICS, AND THE DECISIONS JUSTICES MAKE 8–11 (2011). 
 174.  Rachael K. Hinkle, Legal Constraint in the US Courts of Appeals, 77 J. POL. 721, 722 
(2015). 
 175.  See PAMELA C. CORLEY, AMY STEIGERWALT & ARTEMUS WARD, THE PUZZLE OF 
UNANIMITY: CONSENSUS ON THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT 12 (2013). 
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therefore clarity, science may moderate the influence of ideology on deci-
sionmaking.176  Justices are also more likely to write separately to explain a 
counter-attitudinal vote.177 In other words, if a liberal Justice casts a con-
servative vote, she is more likely to write a concurring or dissenting opinion 
to indicate why.  Citing science may be a useful tool in such opinions.  The 
Ideological Moderation Hypothesis thus predicts the opposite of the Ideolog-
ical Polarization Hypothesis—Justices will be less likely to make appeals to 
science when they write opinions consistent with their ideology. 
B.  Data and Summary Statistics 
To test these hypotheses, I created an original dataset of Supreme Court 
citations to social science from 1954 to 2018.  I generated the data using a 
series of targeted searches of the Westlaw database, which I then merged with 
the Supreme Court Database.178  The data attempts to capture as many journal 
articles and books as possible within the following academic disciplines: an-
thropology, economics, education, geography, linguistics, psychiatry, psy-
chology, political science, public health, social work, and sociology.  I rec-
ognize many academic disciplines in the natural sciences produce research 
that is relevant to Supreme Court cases, and that analysis will be conducted 
in a future version of this project. 
The Bluebook, while infuriating,179 creates a predictable method of 
searching for books and journal articles cited in judicial opinions.  According 
to The Bluebook rules, the title of the book or journal occurs shortly before 
the year of publication.  To assist in my searches for publication titles and 
years of publication, I used wildcard searches on Westlaw, which capture 
variations of words with a common stem.  For example, searching “19!” will 
return all numbers starting with “19”, capturing hits from 1900 to 1999.  This 
term will locate scientific studies published in the twentieth century. 
My search protocols also assume many journal and book titles within a 
discipline include the name of that discipline.  Wildcard searches help here, 
too.  Searching Westlaw for “pol!” will capture the words “politics,” “politi-
cal,” and “policy,” all of which help identify book and journal titles within 
political science.  As a robustness check, I cross-referenced the search terms 
against a database of every journal in each discipline.  On average, the search 
terms successfully identified 59% of journals per scientific field.  The results 
of this analysis and other information about data collection are available in 
the Appendix. 
                                                        
 176.  See supra Section I.A. 
 177.  See Paul M. Collins, Cognitive Dissonance on the U.S. Supreme Court, 64 POL. RES. Q. 
362, 371 (2011). 
 178.  Modern Database, SUPREME COURT DATABASE http://scdb.wustl.edu/data.php (last vis-
ited Apr. 29, 2019). 
 179.  See Richard A. Posner, The Bluebook Blues, 120 YALE L.J. 850, 858 (2011). 
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Table 1 provides an overview of how frequently Supreme Court opin-
ions cite at least one study from each discipline in the sample.  As displayed 
in Table 1, political science is the most commonly cited social science disci-
pline, while there are no references to social work or linguistics studies.  The 
latter non-finding is particularly intriguing because originalism developed in 
part as a reaction to trends in linguistic scholarship.180 








Political Science 83 
Psychiatry 28 
Psychology 40 
Public Health 13 
Social Work 0 
Sociology 19 
 
The overall number of opinions citing science is very low when one 
considers the Justices wrote 16,420 opinions during this time frame.  By con-
trast, the Harvard Law Review and Yale Law Journal have each been cited in 
more than one thousand Supreme Court cases since the dawn of the Warren 
Court.181 
Table 2 summarizes which Justices are more likely to reference science.  
Justice Brennan cited at least one social science study in twenty of his opin-
ions, more than any other Justice in the sample.  In terms of percentage of 
opinions that make appeals to science, however, Justice Stephen Breyer leads 
                                                        
 180.  Jesse Pearson, Bryan Garner, VICE (Nov. 30, 2010, 7:00 PM), 
https://www.vice.com/en_us/article/5g53bd/bryan-garner-641-v17n12 (quoting Garner, who co-
authored two books about originalism with Justice Antonin Scalia, saying, “And there is a view 
among some inane linguists that says that we shouldn’t be teaching nonstandard speakers the stand-
ard dialect—that it’s simply the dialect of the people in power.  Instead, we should be teaching 
everyone to be accepting of linguistic differences.”). 
 181.  Specifically, the Harvard Law Review has been cited at least once in 1,006 Supreme Court 
cases, while the Yale Law Journal has at least one citation in 1,019 cases.  These figures would be 
significantly higher if I went through and tallied citations in individual opinions, like I counted 
references to social science studies. 
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the pack.  As mentioned earlier, both Justice Brennan and Justice Breyer re-
ceived undergraduate degrees in social science fields.182 
Seven Justices did not cite social science in any of their opinions.  Aside 
from Justice Black, these Justices served on the Court for only a few terms 
covered in the sample.  Another interesting finding in Table 2 is that Chief 
Justices appear much less likely to rely on scientific evidence compared to 
associate Justices.  Only Chief Justice Burger cited science in at least one 
percent of his opinions.  As mentioned earlier, Chief Justice Warren appealed 
to science only once—in Footnote 11 of Brown v. Board of Education.183 
TABLE 2. SUPREME COURT OPINIONS CITING SCIENTIFIC STUDIES, BY 
JUSTICE 
Justice Opinions Percentage 
Breyer 16 3.0 
Sotomayor 5 2.8 
Kennedy 16 2.6 
Alito 5 1.8 
Blackmun 15 1.7 
Brennan 20 1.6 
Ginsburg 7 1.6 
Souter 6 1.6 
White 17 1.5 
Burger 6 1.2 
Stewart 10 1.2 
Thomas 8 1.2 
Douglas 10 1.0 
Stevens 16 1.0 
Goldberg 1 0.9 
Marshall 9 0.9 
Scalia 8 0.9 
Kagan 1 0.8 
Fortas 1 0.7 
Rehnquist 7 0.7 
Frankfurter 2 0.6 
                                                        
 182.  See supra notes 144–145 and accompanying text. 
 183.  See supra Section I.B. 
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Harlan 5 0.6 
Powell 5 0.6 
Roberts 1 0.6 
Clark 2 0.5 
O’Connor 3 0.5 
Warren 1 0.3 
Black 0 0.0 
Burton 0 0.0 
Gorsuch 0 0.0 
Jackson 0 0.0 
Minton 0 0.0 
Reed 0 0.0 
Whitaker 0 0.0 
 
Table 3 reviews the legal issues considered in cases that cite science and 
compares them to the Supreme Court’s overall docket.  On some issues, for 
example cases involving unions or criminal procedure, appeals to science oc-
cur at a lower rate than one would expect given how frequently they come 
before the Court.  On many other issues, including civil rights, the First 
Amendment, due process, and privacy, Justices make scientific references at 
a higher rate than they appear on the docket. 
TABLE 3. LEGAL ISSUE IN CASES WITH OPINIONS CITING SCIENTIFIC 
STUDIES 
Issue Area Cases Sample % Docket % 
Criminal Procedure 29 16.3 25.5 
Civil Rights 48 27.6 17.3 
First Amendment 29 17.7 10.9 
Due Process 12 5.9 4.1 
Privacy 22 4.9 1.9 
Attorneys 2 0.5 1.3 
Unions 1 2.0 3.8 
Economic Activity 30 13.8 18.0 
Judicial Power 13 6.9 9.8 
Federalism 12 3.5 4.1 
Miscellaneous 2 1.0 0.1 
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While the descriptive statistics above reveal interesting patterns in the 
data, they do not tell the whole story.  The next Section tests each hypothesis 
developed in Section II.A.  Multivariate analyses highlight which Justice-
level, opinion-level, and case-level factors play a significant role in the rela-
tionship between science and Supreme Court opinion-writing. 
III.  ANALYZING THE INFLUENCE OF SCIENCE ON SUPREME COURT 
BEHAVIOR 
This Section presents two multivariate regression analyses.  The first, 
presented in Table 4, tests the conditions under which an opinion is more 
likely to cite at least one scientific study and tests the Science Major Hypoth-
esis, the Judicial Liberalism Hypothesis, and the Case Salience Hypothesis.  
The second multivariate analysis, displayed in Table 5, examines the inter-
play between the use of science, judicial ideology, and the ideological direc-
tion of judicial opinions.  These regressions provide tests for the Ideological 
Moderation and Ideological Polarization Hypotheses. 
A.  Methods and Variables 
The dependent variable in the first regression analysis is whether a given 
Supreme Court opinion cites at least one scientific study.  The dichotomous 
nature of the dependent variable makes logistic regression an appropriate 
method.  However, logistic regression assumes positive and negative out-
comes are equally likely to occur.  Very few Supreme Court opinions cite 
scientific studies, so traditional logistic regression may create biased results.  
Therefore, instead, the analysis employs the Firth logistic regression program 
in Stata, which uses penalized maximum likelihood coefficients to estimate 
rare events.184 
The dependent variable in the second regression is also dichotomous: 
whether a Supreme Court opinion supports the liberal position in a given 
case.  Because a Justice’s ideology is strongly correlated with the ideological 
directions of their opinions, ordinary logistic regression could create biased 
coefficients.185  Consequently, instead, each model in Table 5 uses multilevel 
logistic regression with a random intercept for each Justice. 
The analyses employ judicial common space scores as measures of Ju-
dicial Ideology, with higher values indicating more conservative Justices. 186  
The Science Major variable is a dichotomous measure of whether a Justice 
                                                        
 184.  See Rainer Puhr et al., Firth’s Logistic Regression with Rare Events: Accurate Effect Esti-
mates and Predictions?, 36 STAT. IN MED. 2302, 2302 (2017). 
 185.  See ANDREW GELMAN & JENNIFER HILL, DATA ANALYSIS USING REGRESSION AND 
MULTILEVEL/HIERARCHICAL MODELS (2007). 
 186.  See Epstein et al., supra note 11, at 318–20. 
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has at least one bachelor’s degree in math, any natural science, or social sci-
ence.  Judicial Review Case is a dichotomous variable that takes the value of 
one if at least one of the authorities for the Court’s decision involved federal 
or state judicial review.  The Declared Unconstitutional variable measures 
whether the Court struck down a federal or state law, either in part or in its 
entirety. 
The Divided Court variable measures the inverse of the size of the ma-
jority coalition in a given case.  In other words, a case decided 9-0 takes the 
value of negative nine, whereas a case decided 5-4 is recorded as negative 
one.  I used the Supreme Court Database to build variables that differentiate 
between Majority, Concurring, and Dissenting Opinions.  The database also 
contains a variable that reflects whether the majority opinion in the case in 
question formally altered precedent.  I merged data from other scholars to 
measure the total number of amicus curiae briefs submitted for each case187 
and a Case Salience Index based on the breadth of media coverage generated 
by each case.188  I also utilized the Supreme Court Database to construct a 
dichotomous Administrative Agency Case variable, which measures whether 
the case originated at an administrative hearing or proceeding.  These cases 
may be more technical in nature and require scientific evidence to decide 
them.189 
B.  Regression Analysis of Citing Science in an Opinion 
Table 4 presents the results of two Firth logistic regression models pre-
dicting the circumstances under which a Supreme Court opinion is likely to 
cite at least one scientific study.  In Model 1, judicial ideology exerts a sta-
tistically significant effect in the predicted direction, confirming the Judicial 
                                                        
 187.  Paul M. Collins, Jr., Data, U. MASS. AMHERST: PAUL M. COLLINS, JR., 
https://blogs.umass.edu/pmcollins/data/ (last visited Apr. 29, 2019); e-mail from John M. Scheb, 
Professor of Political Sci., Univ. Tenn. (Mar. 18, 2019) (on file with author).  Dr. Scheb is one of 
the co-authors of the study.  Pacelle et al., supra note 169. 
 188.  Todd Collins & Christopher A. Cooper, Case Salience Index 1953-2014 Terms, HARVARD 
DATAVERSE (2016), https://dataverse.harvard.edu/dataset.xhtml?persisten-
tId=doi:10.7910/DVN/UR2KYE (last visited Apr. 29, 2019).  The additive index ranges from zero 
to eight based on the case’s presence in the New York Times, Chicago Tribune, Los Angeles Times, 
and Washington Post.  If one of those newspapers covers the case, it is recorded as one, but if it 
receives front-page coverage it is coded as two. 
 189.  For example, Verizon questioned whether the FCC had the power to require state utility 
commissions to set rates on a forward-looking basis.  Verizon Commc’ns v. FCC, 535 U.S. 467, 
475 (2002).  Before the case could reach the Supreme Court in 2002, the dispute began with a 1994 
FCC order.  Admin. N. Am. Numbering Plan, 9 FCC Rcd. 2068, (Apr. 4, 1994).  The F.C.C. calcu-
lated rates based on a defined “cost,” abandoning the old fair-value approach.  See, e.g., Verizon 
Commc’ns, 535 U.S. at 484 (citing ALFRED KAHN, THE ECONOMICS OF REGULATION: PRINCIPLES 
AND INSTITUTIONS 40–41 (1988)). 
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Liberalism Hypothesis.190  Figure 1 visualizes this finding—liberal Justices 
are more likely to cite scientific studies than conservative Justices.   
TABLE 4. PENALIZED MAXIMUM LIKELIHOOD LOGISTIC REGRESSION 
MODEL OF OPINIONS CITING SCIENCE 
Predictor Model 1 Model 2 
   
Judicial Ideology -0.377*** -0.470*** 
 (0.139) (0.149) 
Science Major 0.306** 0.305** 
 (0.145) (0.154) 
Judicial Review Case 0.929*** 0.662*** 
 (0.171) (0.183) 
Declared Unconstitutional 0.752*** 0.392** 
 (0.175) (0.192) 
Altered Precedent 0.732*** 0.191 
 (0.258) (0.310) 
Divided Court 0.096*** 0.041 
 (0.028) (0.029) 
Administrative Agency Case 0.056 0.035 
 (0.168) (0.176) 
Concurring Opinion -0.937*** -1.049*** 
 (0.217) (0.226) 
Dissenting Opinion -0.445*** -0.534*** 
 (0.161) (0.175) 
Term 0.021*** 0.017*** 
 (0.004) (0.005) 
Case Salience Index  0.218*** 
  (0.036) 
Amicus Curiae Briefs  0.014*** 
  (0.005) 
Constant -46.618*** -38.780*** 
 (8.901) (10.326) 
   
Observations 16,411 14,535 
χ2 165.9*** 180.7*** 
       *** p < 0.01; ** p < 0.05; * p < 0.10 
                                                        
 190.  The consensus in political science is that a p-value of less than 0.10 is required to describe 
a finding as statistically significant, although p-values of less than 0.05 provide stronger evidence 
that the result is not due to chance. 
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The results indicate a one standard deviation change from the mean ide-
ology in the liberal direction increases the predicted probability of invoking 
science by 17.2%.  Model 1 also supports the Science Major Hypothesis.  
Justices who studied a scientific discipline as an undergraduate are 35.4% 
more likely than others to cite social science. 
 
FIGURE 1. THE EFFECT OF JUDICIAL IDEOLOGY ON THE PROBABILITY 
OF CITING SOCIAL SCIENCE 
 
The evidence for the Case Salience Hypothesis is also quite strong.  Sci-
entific studies are 3.5 times more likely to be referenced in cases involving 
judicial review than other case types.  If the Court strikes down the law in 
question, the probability a Justice will reference social science increases by 
an additional factor of 2.1.  If the Court alters a previous precedent, regardless 
of whether the case involves constitutional or statutory interpretation, the 
likelihood of an opinion making a scientific appeal doubles.  Justices are 
more likely to cite science in cases when the Court is more sharply divided.  
As the size of the majority coalition shrinks by one standard deviation from 
the mean (from roughly a four-vote majority coalition to a roughly two-vote 
majority coalition), the likelihood of finding a scientific citation increases by 
31.6%. 
Model 2 of Table 4 adds two additional variables to those analyzed in 
Model 1: the number of amicus curiae briefs submitted and the Case Salience 
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observations is smaller than Model 1 because the authors who calculated the 
amicus brief data and Case Salience Index could not find data for every case.  
The results across the models remain similar, although the Alteration of Prec-
edent and Divided Court variables are no longer statistically significant.  
However, the two new variables in Model 2 are statistically significant, 
providing additional support for the Case Salience Hypothesis. 
A one standard deviation change in the Case Salience Index increases 
the probability of a Justice citing science by 63.9%.  Figure 2 displays this 
relationship.  A similar finding occurs when more amici participate in a case.  
When the total number of amicus briefs increases by one standard deviation 
(7.4) from its mean (3.9), a Justice becomes 10.6% more likely to make a 
scientific appeal.  While it is beyond the scope of this current study, it is likely 
that amicus briefs, like the one the NAACP submitted in Brown, provide the 
Court with relevant social science research they can choose to cite. 
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The control variables also yield interesting findings, based on the results 
of Model 1.  The likelihood of an opinion citing science increases by an av-
erage of 2.1% each term.191  Cases originating with administrative agency 
proceedings, however, are no more or less likely to produce opinions citing 
science.  Authors of concurring opinions are 60.4% less likely to make sci-
entific appeals, compared to majority opinions.192  Dissenting opinions are 
also 35.6% less likely to cite science.  Citing science in a majority opinion 
may have more utility than in a concurrence or a dissent.  As Robert Hume 
theorized, referencing unifying historical rhetoric “can hold together a ma-
jority coalition or encourage a wavering Justice to sign on.”193  This same 
dynamic may be at play when it comes to citing scientific studies. 
C.  Regression Analysis of the Ideological Effect of Citing Science in 
Supreme Court Opinions 
 The analysis displayed in Table 5 measures the effect of Judicial Ide-
ology and the decision to cite science on the ideological direction of an opin-
ion.  These models contain interaction terms between the two independent 
variables to analyze the degree to which citing science and judicial policy 
preferences jointly co-vary.194  This modeling strategy provides a test for the 
Ideological Polarization and Ideological Moderation Hypotheses.  Evidence 
that a liberal Justice is less likely to write a liberal opinion (or a conservative 
Justice, a conservative opinion) that cites science would support the Ideolog-
ical Moderation Hypothesis.   
Instead, the results are the opposite and provide evidence for the Ideo-
logical Polarization Hypothesis.  The probability of a Justice on the Court’s 
far left writing a liberal opinion is 0.117 higher when they invoke science.  
Similarly, citing science increases the probability that a Justice on the Court’s 
far-right will write a conservative opinion by 0.113.  Figure 3 displays the 
results of Model 1. 195 
                                                        
 191.  The coefficients in logistic regression models do not directly indicate what impact a one-
unit change of an independent variable will have on the probability of the dependent variable being 
one.  Instead, all reported effect sizes are based on the calculations of predicted probabilities, hold-
ing all other covariates at their means. 
 192.  Majority opinions are omitted from Table 4 because they serve as the reference category 
against which the analysis measures the effect of writing a Concurring or Dissenting Opinion. 
 193.  Hume, supra note 158, at 818. 
 194.  One cannot conclude from the results displayed in Table 5 that a statistically significant 
interaction term provides evidence for the Ideological Polarization or Ideological Moderation Hy-
potheses.  Instead, statistical significance must be calculated across a range of relevant values (in 
this case different levels of Judicial Liberalism).  See Thomas Brambor, William Roberts Clark & 
Matt Golder, Understanding Interaction Models: Improving Empirical Analyses, 14 POL. 
ANALYSIS 63, 64 (2006).  Table A2 of the Appendix reports these individual calculations of statis-
tical significance. 
 195.  These polarizing differences at every data point, save for the Court’s mean ideology, are 
statistically significant.  See the Appendix for more details. 
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TABLE 5. MULTILEVEL LOGISTIC REGRESSION MODEL OF OPINION 
DIRECTION WITH JUSTICE-LEVEL RANDOM INTERCEPTS 
Predictor Model 1 Model 2 
   
Judicial Ideology -1.431*** -2.476*** 
 (0.073) (0.185) 
Cites Study 0.066 0.197 
 (0.167) (0.427) 
Cites Study*Ideology -0.895** -2.645** 
 (0.380) (1.271) 
Constant 0.193*** -0.028 
 (0.042) (0.148) 
Random Intercept 0.040*** 0.613*** 
 (0.015) (0.186) 
   
Observations 16,168 5,958 
Number of groups  34 34 
χ2 3.5*** 185.4*** 
LR χ2 63.4*** 272.4*** 
                             *** p < 0.01; ** p < 0.05; * p < 0.10 
 
Model 2 examines only dissenting opinions, and the results provide even 
stronger evidence of polarization.  The probability that a Justice who is one 
standard deviation more liberal than the Court’s average will write a liberal 
opinion increases by 0.150 when they cite science.  If a Justice one-standard 
deviation more conservative than the mean cites science, the probability they 
will write a conservative opinion increases by 0.148.  Figure 4 displays these 
results.196 
These findings are even more impressive in light of the “floor and ceil-
ing effects” in these models.  Each of the four figures in the Article have a y-
axis that measures a predicted probability that ranges from zero to one, the 
equivalent range of zero to one hundred percent.  Overall, a Justice at the 
Court’s far left wing will write a liberal dissent about eighty-seven percent 
of the time.  A Justice on the far right, by contrast, will write a liberal dissent 
fourteen percent of the time.  Considering how close these values are to the 
top and bottom of the y-axis scale (the ceiling and floor), there is not much 
room for a Justice at either extreme to become more ideological in her deci-
sionmaking.  And yet, when a Justice on the far left or right cites science in 
                                                        
 196.  At every point displayed in Figure 4, except for the Court’s mean ideology, citing science 
exerts a statistically significant, polarizing effect.  See the Appendix for more information on the 
size of these effects. 
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a dissent, they are even more likely to do so in an ideologically-congruous 
opinion. 
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The polarizing effect of citing science in a dissenting opinion may re-
flect a Justice’s desire to persuade the public, other external actors, or a future 
Supreme Court that the majority opinion was not just wrong as a matter of 
law but also a distortion of objective reality.  Dissenting opinions, according 
to Chief Justice Charles Evans Hughes, represent “an appeal to the brooding 
spirit of the law, to the intelligence of a future day, when a later decision may 
possibly correct the error into which the dissenting judge believes the court 
to have been betrayed.”197  Science can provide additional evidence that the 
Court had erred. 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
The findings discussed in this Article, while preliminary, suggest the 
Court faces significant obstacles in how it uses science.  Justices very rarely 
make appeals to science, although those who majored in a scientific disci-
pline are more likely to do so.  Across several different measures of case 
salience, the results consistently demonstrate that scientific appeals occur 
more frequently in more prominent cases.  When the Justices do invoke sci-
ence, other normatively troubling patterns emerge.  Liberal Justices are more 
likely to cite science than conservative Justices.  The decision to cite science 
is one that polarizes Justices on the Court’s left and right.  Rather than letting 
scientific knowledge mitigate a Justice’s ideological proclivities, the data in-
dicate Justices on both ends of the spectrum resort to scientific arguments to 
bolster their underlying worldviews. 
Future research is needed to see if these findings generalize to references 
to other academic disciplines, especially in the natural sciences.  While this 
study attempts to document the output of scientific information in judicial 
opinions, it does not provide insight into how the Justices find scientific in-
formation.  Do the Justices conduct literature reviews on their own or with 
their clerks?  Alternatively, do Justices only cite science when a brief pro-
vides a potential reference?  I hope to address this in future research, along 
with refining the search protocols and identifying a way to measure whether 
a Justice cites science positively or negatively. 
Further research is also needed because of the high stakes involved in 
the use, non-use, or misuse of science in judicial opinions.  Sometimes, the 
Court creates legal controversy when it relies on poorly-designed scientific 
research, as the debate about Footnote 11 in Brown exemplifies.198  Judges, 
such as the one tasked with desegregating the Washington, D.C. public 
schools, may throw up their hands in frustration when encountering scientific 
                                                        
 197.  CHARLES EVANS HUGHES, THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 68 (1936). 
 198.  See supra notes 94–98 and accompanying text. 
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research they do not understand.199  Even ostensibly pro-science Justices 
might misstate scientific conclusions, as Justice Brennan did in Craig v. 
Boren.200 
Sometimes, the consequences of judicial reliance on substandard re-
search are insidious and long-lasting.  The racist pseudo-science comparing 
the brains of white and black Americans provided a veneer of objectivity to 
segregationist legal precedents that lasted more than a half century.201  Junk 
science also muddled Eighth Amendment debates over execution methods.  
Most states eventually abandoned the electric chair, but nine states still allow 
death by electrocution as a “backup” method to lethal injection.202  The 
United States Supreme Court’s holding in Kemmler still stands, and only two 
state supreme courts (Georgia203 and Nebraska204) have leveraged modern 
scientific research to strike down electrocution as being unconstitutionally 
cruel.  Thus, more than a century later, junk science undergirds Eighth 
Amendment doctrine in most of the United States. 
We might excuse ordinary citizens who engage in partisan-motivated 
reasoning when it comes to their attitudes towards science, but perhaps citi-
zens should expect more from their judges, especially when correctly inter-
preting top-flight social scientific research can inform the Court on any num-
ber of legal issues.  Even if a Justice feels overwhelmed, scientific 
associations frequently submit amicus briefs, which break down complex sci-
entific concepts into more digestible language.205  If a Justice remains befud-
                                                        
 199.  See supra notes 87–91 and accompanying text. 
 200.  See supra notes 105–115 and accompanying text. 
 201.  See supra notes 57–62 and accompanying text. 
 202.  These states are Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Kentucky, Mississippi, Oklahoma, South 
Carolina, Tennessee, and Virginia.  Methods of Execution, DEATH PENALTY INFORMATION 
CENTER, https://deathpenaltyinfo.org/executions/methods-of-execution (last visited Aug. 23, 
2019). 
 203.  Dawson v. State, 554 S.E.2d 137, 144 (Ga. 2001) (“The Legislature’s adoption of lethal 
injection as the exclusive method for executing the death penalty in Georgia reflects societal con-
sensus that the ‘science of the present day’ has provided a less painful, less barbarous means for 
taking the life of condemned prisoners.”). 
 204.  State v. Mata, 745 N.W.2d 229, 266 (Neb. 2008) (“Scientific knowledge about electricity 
and its effects on the human body has vastly expanded since 1913, when the Nebraska Legislature 
first selected electrocution over hanging.”). 
 205.  See AMERICAN PSYCHOLOGICAL ASSOCIATION, DIVISION OFFICERS HANDBOOK App. IV 
(Rev. ed. 2003), https://www.apa.org/about/division/officers/handbook/index?item=17 (“If partici-
pation as amicus curiae is approved, the Office of General Counsel will undertake preparation of 
the brief. . . .  Appropriate experts in the field will be consulted in the course of drafting the 
brief . . . .”).  Once again, the American Political Science Association is an unfortunate exception.  
Although individual political scientists have sometimes written amicus briefs, the Association itself 
has only joined one brief in the last fifteen years.  American Political Science Association, APSA 
Public Statements and Letters, https://www.apsanet.org/ABOUT/APSA-Public-Statements-and-
Letters (last visited May 4, 2019). 
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dled, they may consult a Supreme Court Fellow, hired for their scientific re-
search skills.206  In short, even if a case seems full of “gobbledygook,” a con-
scientious Supreme Court Justice has tools available to make sense of social 
science.    
                                                        
 206.  See Fellowship Placements, SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, 
https://www.supremecourt.gov/fellows/fellowships.aspx (last visited Apr. 6, 2019) (“The Federal 
Judicial Center is the education and research agency for the federal judiciary.  It provides orientation 
and continuing education for all federal judges . . . on specific subjects, such as patent law, scientific 
evidence, or arbitration, and empirically based studies in judicial reform. . . .  The Fellow serving 
at the Federal Judicial Center supports the Center’s research and educational activities . . . .” (em-
phases added)). 
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APPENDIX 
To contextualize the data presented in Table 1, I do not attempt to count 
how many studies within a given discipline one opinion cites.  However, if 
the same opinion cites studies from multiple disciplines, I count the opinion 
in both scientific fields.  I consulted the websites of many interdisciplinary 
journals to attempt to identify if there was a dominant discipline.  The sample 
does not include any law reviews, including interdisciplinary law reviews. 
The following is an example of my search protocols.  The term 
OP(Politic! +5 19!) searches each opinion (thus excluding the case’s head-
notes) for any word beginning with the letters “Politic” (like Politics or Po-
litical) followed (within five words) by any number beginning with 19 (like 
1995).  This term should capture studies published in most political science 
journals in the twentieth century, and tweaking the search term to OP(Pol! 
+5 20!) should uncover twenty-first-century studies. 
To test the thoroughness of my search terms, I downloaded a list of 
every journal within each social science discipline listed in the Journal Cita-
tion Reports database.207  Table A1 reports the percentage of journals within 
each academic field that would be captured by the corresponding Westlaw 
search term. 
 









Political Science 53 
Psychiatry 61 
Psychology 68 
Public Health 49 
Social Work 71 
Sociology 70 
 
                                                        
 207.  Journal Citation Reports, CLARIVATE ANALYTICS, 
https://clarivate.com/webofsciencegroup/solutions/journal-citation-reports/ (last visited Apr. 8, 
2019). 
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Table A2 contextualizes the effect size and statistical significance of the 
interaction term between judicial ideology and citing science analyzed in Ta-
ble 5. 
 
TABLE A2. MARGINAL EFFECT OF CITING SCIENTIFIC STUDIES ON 
WRITING A LIBERAL OPINION, BY IDEOLOGY (USING THE TABLE 5 MODELS) 
 Model 1 Model 2 
Ideology M.E. p M.E. P 
Far Left 0.117 0.000 0.110 0.000 
-1 S.D. 0.104 0.013 0.150 0.026 
Average -0.011 0.792 -0.031 0.440 
+1 S.D. -0.130 0.005 -0.148 0.000 
Far Right -0.145 0.000 -0.116 0.000 
Liberal (Avg.) 0.105 0.012 0.152 0.015 
Conservative 
(Avg.) -0.113 0.015 -0.145 0.023 
 
 
 
